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Abstract 
 
Two varieties of aesthetic virtue are distinguished. Trait virtues are features of the agent’s character, and 
reflect an overarching concern for aesthetic goods such as beauty and novelty, while faculty virtues are 
excellences of artistic execution that permit the agent to succeed in her chosen domain. The distinction 
makes possible a fuller account of why art matters to us – it matters not only insofar as it is aesthetically 
good, but also in its capacity as an achievement that is creditable to an individual, and as a reflection or 
embodiment of virtuous motives.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A virtue theory of aesthetics places a special emphasis upon the artist and her character traits, 
skills, dispositions and motivations (Goldie 2007, 2008, 2010; Kieran 2010, 2012; Lopes 
2008; Woodruff 2001). It aims to encourage a redirection of philosophical attention, such 
that the primary objects of aesthetic enquiry and evaluation are taken to include not only 
art objects, but also artistic activities of creation, performance, and appreciation. Just as 
virtue ethics holds that moral evaluation properly targets the person and the qualities of 
her character, as well as her actions, so the virtue theory of art recommends a focus on 
the ways in which the agent’s aesthetic virtues and vices are manifested in practises of 
artmaking and art-appreciation. Aesthetic evaluation is appropriately directed not only at 
the products of artistic activity – paintings, dances, sculptures and so forth – but at the 
qualities of the person performing such activities, including her individual virtues and 
vices.   
 
Construed modestly, the aim of the virtue theory is simply to promote this broadening of 
the subject matter of philosophical aesthetics: to capture something of interest about the 
role of creative events, intentions, and behaviours in the production and appreciation of 
the works of art that form the traditional aesthetic domain. More strongly, the virtue 
theorist may hold that the aesthetic virtues have a conceptual or explanatory priority 
within the project of defining the nature of art itself, such that artworks are taken 
necessarily to be the products of virtuous activity suitably understood. 
 
A virtue-oriented approach, moreover, provides novel resources for tackling the question 
of why art matters to us (as Goldie 2008: 180, has put it). By attending to artistic forms of 
excellence, as we attend elsewhere to qualities of an individual’s moral and intellectual 
character, we can better understand the value of artworks qua products of aesthetic 
virtue. For Goldie, the source of this value lies in the contribution of aesthetically 
virtuous action to human flourishing; specifically, to the rich forms of interpersonal 
emotional sharing that are afforded by participation in art making and art enjoyment. Art 
objects are thus thought to be instrumentally good, on this analysis, insofar as they 
provide opportunities for creative and appreciative virtues to be exercised. An alternative 
view of the connection between aesthetic virtue and the value of art is presented by 
Dominic Lopes (2008), who reverses this order of explanation in arguing that the 
aesthetic virtues inherit a species of intrinsic value from the artworks towards which they 
are essentially and positively directed. The aesthetic virtues accrue their value from the 
explanatorily prior value of art itself, for instance the beauty, elegance, or novelty of a 
creation.  
 
This paper has two aims. Firstly, to carve a taxonomic distinction among types of 
aesthetic virtue, to provide an account of the psychological and behavioural features of 
an agent that are to be counted among her aesthetic virtues and vices. Secondly, to use 
this distinction to argue for two further answers to the question of why artworks that are 
the products of aesthetic virtue matter to us. I will argue that both issues can be 
productively informed by drawing closely upon the domain of virtue epistemology, 
within which detailed analyses of varieties of virtue, and their associated values, have 
been more fully developed (e.g. Axtell 1997; Battaly 2008; Greco 2000; Sosa 2007; 
Zagzebski 1996). On the taxonomic question, I exploit a central distinction between two 
kinds of virtue that has been recognised by epistemologists interested in the intellectual 
excellences. On the one hand, epistemic virtue responsibilists (e.g. Code 1987;  
Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebeski 1996) promote a full-blooded conception according to 
which the virtues involved in successful intellectual enterprise are to be modeled closely 
upon Aristotelian moral virtues, where paradigm cases include traits of character such as 
open-mindedness, fairness, and intellectual humility (trait or character virtues). On the 
other hand, epistemic virtue reliabilists (e.g. Greco 2012; Sosa 2007) conceive of 
intellectual virtues in more deflationary terms, and include cognitive and perceptual 
faculties such as vision, memory, and reasoning among the knowledge-conducive 
excellences of the epistemic subject (faculty or ability virtues).      
 
In parallel with the epistemic case, I will argue that two varieties of aesthetic virtue can 
be distinguished: those that belong to the agent’s traits of character and are closely bound 
up with her patterns of motivation and concern, such as aesthetic honesty, courage, and 
integrity; and those that pertain to her abilities to successfully achieve some set of 
aesthetic outcomes, such as technical dexterity with a musical instrument, precision as a 
draftsperson, or the capacity to execute a dance with grace and economy.   
 
Drawing this distinction allows us to identify two forms of value that accrue to artworks 
that are the products of the respective varieties of virtue. By focusing on aesthetic faculty 
virtues – virtues of performance and execution – we can exploit the insights of the 
achievement account of value, as it is found both in epistemology (e.g. Greco 2003, 2009) 
and elsewhere in aesthetics (e.g. Huddleston 2012). When an artistic outcome is an 
achievement that is creditable to a person, due to its being the product of her own 
aesthetic abilities, it gains a distinctive kind of value, in common with achievements in 
other domains, such as sporting or intellectual successes. By focusing on aesthetic trait 
virtues, meanwhile, we can understand works of art as having, or embodying, admirable 
qualities that flow from the agent’s virtuous motivations.  
 
2. Two varieties of epistemic virtue 
 
Virtue epistemology tackles questions concerning the nature and value of knowledge by 
attributing a foundational role to the belief-forming abilities of the doxastic subject, and 
her status as a virtuous or vicious epistemic agent. When making evaluations concerning 
the quality of an agent’s epistemic condition, we are to privilege the ways in which she 
comes to acquire and maintain her beliefs over time, and the various skills and 
intellectual capacities she puts into play during the course of her enquiries. 
 
Virtue epistemologists are divided, however, over how best to conceive of the intellectual 
virtues. Those in the reliabilist tradition hold that individual cognitive faculties such as 
sharp eyesight, accurate memory, and dependable reasoning skills are relevant forms of 
epistemic excellence (e.g. Sosa 1991). True beliefs achieve the status of knowledge, on 
views of this sort, just when they are the products of stable and reliable truth-conducive 
powers of the agent. Those in the responsibilist tradition, meanwhile, argue that 
epistemic virtues should be aligned more closely with the full-blooded qualities 
associated with Aristotelian moral thinking; traits that are appropriately attributed to the 
agent’s cognitive character, such as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, humility, and 
fairness.  
 
Although there is no need to attempt to legislate between these two varieties of 
epistemological virtue theory here, it is worth briefly clarifying the primary differences 
between intellectual virtues construed as faculty excellences and those conceived of as 
character traits, as it is these details that will be taken up in the course of articulating the 
aesthetic virtues more comprehensively. In the latter domain, too, the question is 
whether to treat aesthetic virtues as constituted by faculties and skills deployed by the 
agent in the course of her artistic endeavours, or to see them as deep and abiding 
character traits that show up in acts of artistic creation and appreciation.  
 
On the traits approach, epistemic virtues are “deep qualities of a person, closely 
identified with her selfhood” (Zagzebski 1996: 104). They are stable and enduring 
excellences belonging to the agent herself, for which she can be appropriately evaluated. 
The epistemically virtuous person is intellectually honest, charitable, open-minded, 
courageous, and so forth, where these traits reflect an overarching concern for epistemic 
goods such as truth and understanding. Epistemic honesty, for instance, involves a 
willingness to reflect critically upon one’s own doxastic commitments, to weigh 
countervailing evidence fairly, and to change one’s mind in the face of new information 
even when it is unwelcome. Good believers are those who form and maintain their 
doxastic position according to virtuous dispositions like these, and fail to exemplify 
epistemic vices such as laziness, self-deception and dogmatism. Traits of this sort are 
typically understood to be the agent’s responsibility, in the sense that she has acquired and 
cultivated her character over time, such that these properties become engrained and 
habitual features of her epistemic outlook.  
 
Trait virtues occupy a certain distinctive relation to the agent’s motivational and affective 
states. The virtuous epistemic subject cares about the truth, and is motivated by a desire 
to seek it for its own sake. She is not merely disposed to acquire true beliefs, but to be 
suitably moved by a concern that her doxastic condition accurately depicts the way the 
world is (rather than to accept what it is popular or easy to believe, say). In 
Montmarquet’s (1993: viii) term, an agent is epistemically conscientious when she has such 
an attitude of concern for the truth – an attitude that is reflected in individual truth-
seeking traits such as intellectual honesty or fairness.  
 
The faculties perspective offers a more permissive and deflationary analysis of the 
epistemic virtues. Any stable contributor to the formation of an agent’s beliefs is capable 
of operating virtuously, including perceptual powers and cognitive capacities. On this 
view, the measure of epistemic excellence is reliability – an agent has a faculty virtue just 
when the capacity in question consistently allows her to achieve cognitive contact with 
the world. Acute hearing, a discriminating palate, or powerful recall are thus all examples 
of epistemic faculty virtues. These powers may be either acquired or innate; there is no 
requirement that the subject have invested resources in their cultivation or development. 
She may simply have an exceptional memory, or especially sensitive sensory mechanisms 
in some modality, for instance. Thus they need not be features for which the agent 
rightly deserves special praise or blame; they don’t necessarily reflect her evaluative 
qualities as an individual, and it isn’t appropriate to think less of someone for her 
naturally poor eyesight, for example.   
 
Epistemic faculty virtues also lack a necessary connection to the motivational or affective 
profile of the agent – someone can be an excellent perceiver or reasoner, say, without her 
use of these faculties being driven by a particular concern for the truth. Indeed, an 
epistemically trait-vicious person – who is lazy, dogmatic, or gullible – may nonetheless 
possess a range of high quality faculties.  
 
3. Aesthetic traits and faculties 
 
An analogous distinction may be drawn when taxonomising the aesthetic virtues. To 
anticipate, I hold that there exist faculty virtues associated with individual forms of 
artistic expression and performance – including for example excellence in drawing skill; 
perfect pitch; good rhythm; breath control; or the timbre of one’s voice – and that there 
exist more full-blooded trait virtues that can shape and inform artistic endeavour more 
generally and more deeply, such as aesthetic forms of generosity, honesty, and 
authenticity.   
 
Firstly, note that we speak evaluatively of varieties of aesthetic excellence that seem to 
fall naturally into each of these two categories. We say, on the one hand, that a sketcher 
has excellent draftsmanship, that a dancer has grace and balance, that a singer has an 
impressive vocal range, and so forth. And on the other hand, we speak of a playwright’s 
courage, a poet’s honesty, and a novelist’s integrity. We are happy to attribute to a 
portrait painter a combination of both the excellences of accuracy and steady-
handedness, and the virtues associated with producing a sympathetic but not dishonestly 
flattering likeness of her sitter (Goldie 2008:189). Folk talk concerning aesthetic quality 
thus makes ready use of two kinds of vocabulary when it comes to describing individual 
agents, the former category bearing the hallmarks of faculty virtue, and the latter those of 
trait virtue.  
 
3.1 Aesthetic trait virtues 
 
Aesthetic trait virtues again fit the Aristotelian model in being deep and abiding features 
of an agent that are fully implicated in her personal identity and our evaluation thereof 
(Goldie 2007, 2008).1 In parallel to the epistemic case, we can analyse the aesthetic trait 
virtues in terms of the aesthetically conscientious agent’s possession of an overarching 
concern for the aesthetically good – the beautiful, the elegant, the funny, the novel, the 
conceptually provocative, and so forth. The aesthetically virtuous person is one whose 
traits of character reflect a commitment to the promotion and appreciation of these 
goods; not merely through being dispositions to act in characteristic ways, but by 
constituting engrained patterns of care, affect and motivation. The trait-virtuous agent is 
one who is moved to act in certain ways, to be driven by desires that reflect her 
evaluative take on matters of aesthetic concern, and to feel appropriate sorts of 
emotional response to aesthetically relevant situations.   
 
                                                        
1 Goldie’s treatment of aesthetic virtue is explicitly Aristotelian in character, but he also describes “being a good 
composer, sculptor, or painter” (2010: 832) as a virtue, and this falls more naturally into the second category, that of 
faculty virtue. 
Consider, for example, the virtue of aesthetic courage. In a novelist or painter, say, this 
trait involves being moved to face and overcome various challenges of subject matter 
and execution; to take risks; and to resist the temptation to retreat to safe aesthetic 
ground. The courageous author is not afraid to explore the boundaries of structure and 
form; to use her writing to expose uncomfortable truths; or to transgress societal taboos; 
and nor is she swayed by fear of the critical disapprobation of her peers. Secondly, an 
agent is aesthetically honest when she exhibits the kinds of feature that indicate credibility 
or integrity as an artist: for example by creating art that reveals her perspective on 
matters that are deeply personal, or that will make her unpopular. The trait of honesty is 
exhibited, too, by the portrait painter whose depictions are faithful and revealing without 
being unduly swayed by the desire to please her subject. The courageous artist is 
undeterred by the challenges she faces while pursuing her aesthetic ends; while the 
honest artist does not compromise her pursuit of these ends by being pulled towards the 
popular or the profitable. The aesthetic trait virtues are those that empower one to see 
through the challenging business of creating and appreciating art, including discipline, 
diligence, focus, enthusiasm, carefulness, patience and thoroughness. 
 
In contrast, the aesthetic trait vices are characterised by a lack of appropriate concern for 
the aesthetically good, and a tendency to be driven by competing motives – such as a 
desire for prestige, wealth, or approval. The aesthetically lazy, dishonest, or cowardly 
individual, that is, is too willing to set aside her concern for the beautiful (etc) and is 
instead swayed by external incentives. If a songwriter produces a catalogue of formulaic, 
homogenous melodies because she knows they will sell well, she is guilty of laziness and 
avarice, while the curator who refuses to display anything but the most rarefied or 
inaccessible material can be accused of narrow-mindedness or snobbery (Kieran 2010).  
 
In the doxastic case, a simple desire for the truth does not always suffice for epistemic 
conscientiousness, for an agent can possess such a desire while still suffering from 
intellectual vices such as dogmatism or fanaticism (Montmarquet 1993). These failings 
involve a single-minded fixation on a narrow set of ideas, at the expense of 
countervailing evidence or opinion. In Montmarquet’s view, true epistemic excellence 
involves the exercise of ‘regulative’ virtues – traits that ensure that the desire for truth is 
appropriately expressed in thought and action. Once again, the same is true of the 
aesthetic trait virtues. It is not enough that an agent have an overriding desire for the 
aesthetically good – for this is consistent with her having a vice of excess such as an 
obsessive attachment to a single artistic genre. The aesthetically conscientious person 
must thus be equipped with regulatory virtues suitable for the promotion of aesthetic 
goods; for instance, an open-minded receptivity to possible sources of aesthetic value, or 
the tenacity and ambition to engage with unfamiliar techniques or genres.  
  
The aesthetic trait virtues are the responsibility of the agent who possesses them – they 
are features for which she can be held accountable, and which go some way towards 
constituting her character as a person. This is due, firstly, to the fact that such traits are 
under the subject’s voluntary control and, secondly, because they reveal some of the core 
principles to which she is evaluatively committed. As Zagzebski has put it for the case of 
the moral excellences, “it is part of the nature of virtue… that it is the result of moral 
work on the part of the human agent, and that it be acquired by a process of 
habituation” (1996: 125). Being an honest or generous artist, for instance, is a status for 
which an individual can take responsibility over time, through developing proper habits 
and cultivating practical wisdom. Because the trait virtues are potentially accessible to 
(almost) everyone, we can place legitimate expectations on persons to ensure that they 
take steps to shape their characters appropriately – they are “qualities that deserve praise 
for their presence and blame for their absence” (op cit: 104). 
 
Moreover, an agent’s trait virtues disclose her cares and concerns – in this case, her take 
on the importance of various aesthetic goods – and so constitute an element of her 
personhood for which she is answerable (see, e.g., Smith 2005). We can ask her to 
defend, explain, and justify her position, and expect to receive a response that rationally 
reflects a consistent evaluative perspective. A virtuous critic, for instance, can be 
expected to offer reasons for her value judgements, just as a good epistemic subject can 
provide reasons that justify the beliefs she holds. 
 
One kind of answer to the question of what makes a virtuous artist or appreciator, then, 
appeals to the individual’s quality as a person; to trait virtues that sit alongside moral and 
epistemic excellences in defining the agent’s character, and which can be cultivated and 
refined over time. However, this way of formulating the aesthetic virtues makes no 
reference to the peculiar skills and talents of individual artists, performers, or critics. 
Indeed, the possession of the aesthetic trait virtues, as so far conceived, is consistent with 
a total absence of artistic ability or merit, and the presence of – for example - a tuneless 
singing voice, poor rhythm, childlike drawing skills, or clumsy execution on the piano. In 
the next section, therefore, I defend a second category of aesthetic virtue whose defining 
features mirror those of the epistemic faculty virtues, and which characterise the qualities 
held by an artist or critic who is an excellent performer in their chosen domain.  
 
3.2 Aesthetic faculty virtues 
 
Aesthetic faculties can be understood, in this context, as the broad class of relatively 
stable powers of the agent that contribute to her execution of some artistic activity, such 
as music-making, painting, or sculpture. I will not attempt a definition of artistic activity 
here, but will rely on an appeal to familiar cases in which an individual participates in 
some creative performance the primary end of which is an aesthetic good such as beauty 
and its appreciation. Those faculties that are associated with guitar playing, for instance, 
include shaping and gripping of the fingers, picking and strumming, tuning, and time-
keeping. Those implicated in watercolour painting include composition, colour mixing, 
brushstroke technique, blotting, and washing.  
 
In the epistemic case, we saw that faculty excellence is measured in terms of reliability: 
the extent to which some mechanism is a successful, steady contributor to the agent’s 
stock of true beliefs. There is an analogous sense in which aesthetic faculty virtue can be 
expressed in reliabilist terms, too. A subject possesses the virtue of reliability in respect 
of her aesthetic faculties when they enable her to achieve repeatable success in some 
artistic domain. A reliable pianist plays the right keys, follows the dynamics of the piece, 
and keeps time. A reliable singer stays in tune, controls her breathing, and remembers the 
lyrics. The notion of reliability at issue here, then, is one of technical facility – having and 
exercising a suite of competencies that enable the artist to execute her aesthetic aims.  
 
This is the sense of virtue at play when we say of someone that they draw well, or that 
they are a good violinist, and mean that they have a fine degree of technical proficiency 
in that discipline. The attribution implies that the agent’s achievement is not a one-off, 
and that they have a stable power to replicate a range of similar successes under ordinary 
circumstances. And it implies at least a degree of versatility – we are inclined to withhold 
the attribution of good musician or even of good pianist when faced with someone who can 
play only one piece of music on the instrument, for instance, however well they do so.   
 
The question of what it is for an agent to have the power to perform artistic activities well 
is not to be answered by appeal only to the technical achievements associated with the 
successful completion of some artistic output, however. Indeed, purely technical ability 
may be only the foundation for a comprehensive package of aesthetic faculty excellences. 
A competent flautist, for example – with faculty prowess that characterises good playing 
– can perform well in the sense that she is able to satisfy the demands set by a range of 
musical pieces. But there is a further range of ways in which excellence as a flautist may 
be manifested, and these go beyond mere technical prowess. She may be, for example, a 
passionate musician, or an imaginative performer, or a clever player. Similarly, a competent 
painter may have aptitudes such as an eye for colour and a steady hand, and thus be able 
to produce technically accomplished canvasses. But these abilities do not exhaust the 
ways in which she can be a good painter. On top of them, she may for example be witty, 
or insightful, or sensitive in her painterly capacity. Although the term doesn’t fit perfectly 
with our everyday usage, we can – following Jason Baehr’s (2011) taxonomy of the 
intellectual virtues – label these forms of aesthetic ability talents, to be understood as 
“localized enhancements or excellences of faculties” (2011: 25, emphasis in original). 2 
Aesthetic talents are powers to bring special, positive qualities to one’s artmaking; the 
kinds of quality that mark one out as more than just technically adept in some artistic 
sphere. The talents, moreover, are not simply behavioural competences, but are tied 
closely to intellectual and discriminative powers. To be an imaginative painter requires 
one to have good powers of visual imagery, for instance, while being a witty writer 
requires that one can determine what is funny and capture it in one’s prose.      
 
Several key properties of the aesthetic faculty virtues mark them out from the trait 
virtues. First, although faculty virtues may have been acquired and enhanced over time 
through practice and experience, they need not have been. Some aesthetic competences 
simply come naturally to the artist, such as the capacity of perfect pitch, or an innate 
sense of rhythm. This is true of talents, too. Although wittiness, cleverness, or 
imaginativeness may not be present from birth, they can be in someone’s nature, rather 
                                                        
2 In the epistemic case, talents include insightfulness, imagination, and lateral thinking power – the kinds 
of ability we associate with intelligence.  
than being the product of self-conscious cultivation. Faculty excellences are not available 
to everyone, even with practice. Many people lack natural artistic endowments - they are 
not gifted with a fine voice or good rhythm, for example – and it is rare to find a person 
who excels in more than a few artistic disciplines, either as performer or critic. It follows 
that, as with the case of epistemic faculty virtues such as sensory or mnemonic prowess 
that also fall outside an agent’s voluntary control, these need not be properties for which 
the agent deserves special credit or blame. A person is not to be criticised for her 
inability to paint a stunning landscape, or to perform some challenging musical piece, 
when this failure is no fault of her own.   
 
Secondly, an agent’s aesthetic faculty excellences bear no necessary connection to her 
motivational or affective states. Just as an epistemic subject can reach the truth by 
exercising her reliable faculties even when she doesn’t care about knowledge, so an artist 
or performer can possess great technical expertise and talent but have little concern for 
these qualities or their outputs. A musician whose skills are the result of a punishing 
training regime in childhood, for example, may lack any desire to play the instrument, 
and take little pleasure in doing so. Furthermore, the possession of skill and talent is 
compatible with being driven by any of a range of motives, vicious or virtuous. Wit or 
imagination can be deployed in ways that exhibit cruelty, contempt, or spite, for example, 
while a greedy or cowardly artist can nonetheless perform with great technical facility.  
 
3.3 Two kinds of aesthetic virtue?  
 
Two clarificatory questions must be addressed at this juncture. Are the so-called faculty 
virtues really virtues proper, and does the conceptual distinction between trait and faculty 
excellence really map onto a difference in kinds of aesthetic virtue. Existing work in 
virtue aesthetics has answered the first question in the negative, presenting the aesthetic 
trait virtues as having a distinctive status over and above mere artistic skill and technical 
facility (e.g. Goldie 2007:382). I argue, in contrast, that any complete account of aesthetic 
virtue must make essential reference to the faculties of the agent, and that – to answer 
the second question – it is not always possible to fully specify the trait virtues without 
appeal to corresponding faculty virtues. However, if we are to understand the core 
project of virtue aesthetics to be that of characterising what it is for an agent to be an 
exemplar of aesthetic excellence, then abilities and talents of execution and performance 
are likely to loom large whether we call them ‘virtues’ or not. If we choose to restrict 
‘virtue’ to traits of character articulated along Aristotelian lines, and to label qualities of 
execution ‘faculty excellences’ instead, then both will still contribute to a person-focused 
approach to aesthetics. Moreover, faculty virtues contribute to the value and significance 
of art, as we will see in the next section.  
  
Aesthetic trait and faculty virtues are not fully separable: there are three kinds of 
dependency that hold between them. Firstly, certain aesthetic trait virtues are not 
appropriately attributed to an agent unless she is equipped with suitable faculty prowess. 
Consider the portrait painter again. This artist’s trait of honesty depends upon her ability 
to capture her sitter’s likeness through the exercise of her aesthetic faculties - her 
accuracy as a draftsperson, her use of colour and light, and so forth. Merely being moved 
by a concern to faithfully reflect the sitter in her art counts for little if she hasn’t the skill 
to realise this ambition. Similarly, a songwriter’s committed pursuit of melodic novelty is 
a virtue only insofar as she is genuinely capable of composing music that has a degree of 
originality. These cases imply that there is not always a strict separation between the trait 
and faculty virtues; rather, the latter are sometimes necessary for the former, as the traits 
are partly constituted by qualities of execution as well as by their motivational profiles. 
 
Secondly, the dependency runs the other way in certain cases. That is, the acquisition and 
manifestation of aesthetic faculty excellence can require that the agent have particular 
virtuous character traits. To be an accomplished sculptor in a medium such as marble 
surely demands patience and determination, both in the development of technique and in 
the execution of a piece over a lengthy timescale. Likewise, ballet performance calls for 
persistence and enthusiasm; large-scale visual art entails ambition, and so forth.  
     
Thirdly, there are trait virtues that must be characterised in terms of an agent’s sensitivity 
to her own aesthetic skills and abilities. Consider an aesthetically conscientious singer; 
that is, one who has a dominant concern for the aesthetically good, and suitable states of 
motivation and affect that characterise this evaluative stance. But now imagine that she 
consistently overestimates her own vocal range and ability, and that this mistaken self-
evaluation has the effect that she is excessively willing to perform in public when the 
opportunity arises, to the audience’s dismay. Or take, in contrast, a writer who is too 
modest about her own powers, such that she is reluctant to partake in the creative 
process, or to reveal her work to a readership. This individual, although she too may be 
motivated to pursue the aesthetically good, fails to do so to the best of her ability. These 
cases indicate that part of being a fully virtuous aesthetic agent is having a suitable 
appreciation of one’s own faculty-level aptitude, in order to evaluate how one is best able 
to pursue the aesthetic goods that are the objects of one’s conscientious attitudes. The 
over-enthusiastic singer and the self-effacing writer both have aesthetic deficiencies that 
are the result of failing to properly acknowledge the extent of their own talents and 
abilities. Someone who accurately appraises her own strengths and weaknesses as an 
artist, meanwhile, not only gains a sense of the circumstances under which it is 
appropriate for her to exercise her talents, but is also able to engage in self-improvement 
through practice and training where necessary (and so to exhibit virtues of persistence 
and fortitude). Part of what it is to be aesthetically conscientious – to be fully trait-
virtuous – is thus that one be prepared to keep track of one’s faculty qualities, and to 
deploy them appropriately in the pursuit of aesthetic goods. 
  
4. Virtue and the Value of Art  
 
The distinction between aesthetic trait and faculty virtues allows us to understand more 
fully the many varieties of value that accrue to works of art. Attending to the faculty 
virtues encourages us to understand the virtuous production of art as a kind 
of achievement that is creditable to an agent, and which sees artworks as thus accruing a 
familiar kind of value that is common to agential successes in general. Attending to the 
trait virtues highlights the additional value that accrues to outcomes that are 
appropriately related to virtuous motives, and thus aligns aesthetic activity more closely 
with the traditional virtue-theoretic conception of moral conduct. In drawing these 
values out, I do not follow Lopes in arguing that the virtues inherit their value from the 
intrinsic value of art, nor do I follow Goldie in arguing that the value of art comes from 
its instrumental role in enabling emotional sharing. Both achievement value and 
motivational value are species of final value, determined by the relational properties of an 
entity rather than its intrinsic features, in this case by the connection it bears to the 
qualities of the agent who produced it.   
 
Again, both ways of conceiving of the relation between the exercise of virtue and the 
value of the products of virtuous activity have a precedent in the epistemology literature, 
where the challenge is to account for the additional value that states of knowledge have, 
over and above the value of mere true belief (the Meno Problem, or Primary Value 
Problem, e.g. Pritchard 2007). Epistemic virtue reliabilists treat true beliefs that 
constitute intellectual achievements as more valuable than those that are not attributable 
to the exercise of the agent’s faculty virtues (e.g. Greco 2003, 2009; Riggs 2009); while 
epistemic virtue responsibilists model the value of knowledge on that of well-motivated 
moral behaviour (e.g. Zagzebski 1996).  
 
4.1 Achievement value 
 
Virtue reliabilists appeal to the strong intuition that there is something special about 
successes that are achievements creditable to an agent. A sprinter whose victory is the 
result of her being the fastest runner on the field is to be valued more highly than one 
that is due to the rest of the competitors falling over at the starting line (Pritchard 
2010:19); an archery bullseye is better when it is the product of the sportsperson’s 
unerring skill than when the arrow was caught by a fortuitous gust of wind (Sosa 
2007:28-19). Intellectual successes such as the formation of true beliefs, similarly, accrue 
greater value when they are cognitive achievements rather than mere lucky outcomes. 
That is, when an agent’s true belief issues from the exercise of her own epistemic 
powers, it acquires both the status of knowledge and the additional value that comes with 
this status.3  
 
A catalogue of familiar examples support the parallel proposal that aesthetic 
achievements are to be valued more highly than otherwise-similar outcomes that lack an 
essential connection to the skills and attributes of the agent. Consider our opinion of an 
operatic performance that appears initially to embody an exceptional vocal range and 
tonal purity, and how our evaluation of the singing changes when we learn that the 
performance has been enhanced artificially with auto-tuning technology (see, e.g., Dutton 
1979). We would have a similar evaluative reaction to a hyper-realistic portrait upon 
learning that it had been traced from a photograph, to an elaborate piano riff upon 
discovering that it had been sped-up post-recording, or to an apparently off-the-cuff 
quip upon revealing that it had been scripted and rehearsed.  
 
                                                        
3 In Gettier cases, in contrast, the acquisition of a true belief proceeds by lucky or accidental means, and so the virtue 
reliabilist has an explanation of why it is appropriate to deny such beliefs the status and value of knowledge. 
We care not only about the finished artistic product in cases such as these, but about 
how it came into being: its status as the fruit of someone’s aesthetic labour – the output 
of abilities, expertise, and talents put into practice by the skilled agent. How the work 
was executed matters to our evaluation – we value those art objects and performances 
that constitute achievements, and disfavour those that lack an appropriate connection to 
the individual’s agential powers. If a spilled paint pot yields a simulacrum of an abstract 
expressionist piece, we may enjoy the image and the coincidence, but it ought not to be 
treated – and esteemed - as an artist’s skillful accomplishment.  
 
For an achievement to be creditable to an individual, that person’s abilities must figure 
prominently in the causal explanation of how and why the success was attained (see, e.g. 
Pritchard 2012 for discussion). For an archery achievement, the agent’s various skills as 
an athlete – her strength and posture, the steadiness of her hand and eye, and so forth – 
must be the salient contributors to the arrow’s flight to the bullseye. For a doxastic 
achievement, the acquisition of a true belief must be explained by reference to the 
subject’s cognitive powers, such as her sensory capacities and reasoning skills. Aesthetic 
achievements, too, are those such that any comprehensive explanation of why the 
artwork is the way that it is must advert to the artist’s exercise of her aesthetic faculty 
virtues. If, instead, the perceptible features of a work are best explained in terms of 
competing factors that lie outside of the agent’s capabilities – circumstances of luck or 
accident; the intervention of another person; or the deployment of automating 
technologies4 – then we are inclined to think that these undermine the extent to which 
those features constitute a success that is creditable to the individual herself.   
 
The degree to which some outcome counts as an achievement – as we might say, how 
impressive it is - can vary according to who the protagonist is, and the context in which she 
is housed. Scoring an archery bullseye on a very wide target over a short distance will 
constitute a greater achievement for, say, the young or inexperienced archer than for the 
expert. A particular completion time in a distance-running event may constitute a greater 
achievement in the Paralympic than in the Olympic games. In the aesthetic domain, too, 
a given outcome (an image, a musical performance, a dance move) can be more or less 
impressive depending on who its creator is. We reserve special praise for the one-handed 
                                                        
4 As Dutton (1979) notes, there may well be cases in which an artist’s expertise with a tool or technology permits her 
to achieve music or visual results of which she would otherwise be incapable, and in doing so enjoy a success that is 
still rightly attributed to her.   
piano playing of Paul Wittgenstein, for instance, or for the late-career paintings of 
Monet, whose cataracts led to deteriorating vision.  
 
These considerations lend support to a two-factor analysis of achievement (Pritchard 
2010). Achievements are successes that involve conquering some challenge, and/or that 
require a rare, uncommonly high degree of skill. The challenge or obstacle to be 
overcome may simply be constituted by the effort and investment that it takes to acquire 
a particular ability, such as technical proficiency with a musical instrument, or it may be 
an individual impediment determined by one’s physical makeup or one’s historical and 
cultural environment. For example, the performance of a self-taught musician may be a 
greater achievement than a similar display by somebody who has enjoyed a long and 
well-supported training history. More widely, it is a special achievement to be at the very 
forefront of a new movement in some artistic domain – for instance, to write the very 
first rock and roll songs, or to develop a style of painting – and less of an achievement to 
continue to produce similar pieces once a body of existing work is in place.  
 
Sometimes, secondly, a fine achievement is simply the result of the exercise of a high 
degree of skill; it is the kind of rare feat that only an exalted few are capable of 
performing. Tiger Woods’s putts are not, for him, difficult accomplishments or 
conquerings of an obstacle (Pritchard 2010: 23-24), but they are achievements in virtue 
of requiring a great deal of skill and expertise. The effortless sounding music-making of a 
virtuoso string player, similarly, or the highly graceful motions of a prima ballerina fall 
into this bracket. They are outliers on the scale of skilled performance; successes that we 
prize highly for their exceptional, superlative nature.  
 
The value that something has in its capacity as an achievement is thus not exhausted or 
explained by its intrinsic value. It is a form of final value the understanding of which 
necessitates essential reference to qualities and powers of individual persons. If it is a 
defining theme of a virtue-theoretic approach to aesthetics that attributes of persons 
ought to figure into our evaluative practises, then conceiving of artworks as 
accomplishments of the aesthetic faculty virtues is one way to secure this. Artworks and 
performances can, in addition to exemplifying aesthetic goods such as beauty, wit, and 
elegance, be impressive human achievements; sometimes at the upper limit of human 
ability, sometimes when they exemplify hard-won or exceptional technical skill, and 
sometimes as triumphs over adverse conditions.       
  
4.2 Motivation value 
 
How might an agent’s trait virtues – those features of her character that reflect an 
overarching concern for aesthetic goods such as beauty and novelty – be related to the 
value and significance of art? The position developed by Lopes (2008) is that virtuous 
traits inherit a species of intrinsic value from the artworks towards which they are 
oriented. Lopes takes up G.E. Moore’s proposal that pro-attitudes towards things with 
intrinsic value are themselves intrinsically valuable (Moore 1903). If X is good, in and of 
itself, then it is good to care for X, to desire X, to think highly of X, to hope for X, and 
so forth. If beauty is intrinsically good, then it is intrinsically good to have, cultivate, and 
exercise pro-attitudes towards beauty, including the profiles of concern and motivation 
that characterise the aesthetic trait virtues. This approach, which emphasises how traits 
of character might accrue value in virtue of their relation to some aesthetic good, leaves 
open the question of whether the reverse is also true; that is, whether an artwork can gain 
value through its relation to the qualities of its creator’s character. I suggest that it can.   
 
The problem is to understand how features that belong to an individual – how she thinks 
and feels; what she cares about; what she is motivated to do – might contribute to the 
value of the things that she produces, given that the latter are distinct from, and external 
to, her. Why should an object whose creation was motivated by a particular concern be 
any better or worse than one that lacks this connection to the internal state of the agent? 
In the epistemic case, the virtue responsibilist faces the equivalent question of how an 
agent’s cognitive character might contribute to the value of a belief. The Meno problem, 
from this perspective, concerns how to explain the differential value possessed by true 
beliefs that are the products of intellectually virtuous traits such as open-mindedness, 
humility, and freedom from bias. In what sense might well-motivated, virtuous doxastic 
states be better than poorly-motivated ones?  
 
Linda Zagzebski (2003:15) offers the analogy of a coffee machine that produces 
espresso. The goodness of the espresso is surely not determined by the qualities of the 
machine of which it is an output (for instance, by its reliability), but by the features it has 
in and of itself – its tastiness, richness, hotness and so forth. The challenge for 
epistemology is thus to understand how and why doxastic states should be better or 
worse depending on the qualities of the person who has them (for instance, her reliability 
in coming to have true beliefs), when machine-products, as a rule, don’t accrue value 
from the machines that produce them. Zagzebski’s solution draws upon the familiar 
virtue-theoretic thought that actions can have greater or lesser value depending on the 
motivations that drive them. A donation to a charitable cause, for example, is more 
morally admirable when it is performed out of compassion and concern for the needy 
than when the agent had a selfish wish to look good in front of her peers. Even actions 
that fail to achieve some desirable moral goal can accrue value when they flow from an 
estimable motivation, such as when an individual makes an unsuccessful attempt at a 
heroic rescue.  
 
Actions are thus not related to their author merely as a product is related to a machine; 
they can instead express or manifest that author’s agency, and can thus inherit qualities of 
her character. Both actions and agents can be humble, courageous, and kind; or greedy, 
cowardly, and selfish. To transfer this lesson to the epistemic case, Zagzebski develops 
an action-like conception of belief, according to which the primary targets of epistemic 
evaluation are acts of believing or judging that the agent performs, rather than stored 
doxastic states. Thought of in this way, believings can be seen to bear the same sort of 
close relationship to motivation that ordinary, overt actions enjoy. Well motivated acts of 
judging can have admirable qualities; they can be epistemically fair, for example, or 
intellectually honest. Virtuous true believings, although they may have the same intrinsic 
and instrumental value as any other element of a subject’s doxastic condition, thus 
possess additional value through their connection to traits of the believer’s character.   
 
In the aesthetic domain, there is a clear category of cases for which a parallel account can 
be given, and which demonstrates the contribution that a virtuous character can make to 
the value of a work of art. The clearest members of this class consist of artworks that are 
themselves performances – actions that can gain motivational value in just the same way 
as moral behaviours such as acts of charity or kindness. Acts of dancing or musical 
performance, for example, are episodes in which an agent carries out some complex 
array of actions that can be, or fail to be, governed by high-quality motivations. When an 
instance of dancing is motivated by a love of beauty (or of elegance, or gracefulness), it is 
reasonable to prefer it to an otherwise identical behavioural episode that is not grounded 
in such a motivation – for instance, one that is driven primarily by a desire for prestige or 
riches. As with moral and epistemic behaviour, well-motivated aesthetic actions can be 
appropriately described using the language of individual virtues: a vocal performance can 
be honest; a violin recital can be ambitious, and so forth. In contrast, poorly-motivated 
aesthetic acts can themselves be vicious; for instance the hogging of the limelight by a 
vain actor, or a rock guitarist’s self-indulgently long solo.  
 
Where the object of our aesthetic evaluation is an action (or suite of actions), then, it is 
intelligible to appeal to the contribution of the motivational aspect of an agent’s 
character traits in establishing the value of that action. Virtuous actions that are 
motivated by a love of the aesthetically good are to be preferred to those that are not, 
just as we prefer actions performed out of a love of the morally good, or judgings that 
reflect a love of the truth. A virtuous act of artistic performance is not simply a causal 
product of its author’s activity, separable from her agency and the quality of her motives. 
It can take on her admirable (or contemptible) evaluative properties, and so accrue value 
over and above that which is determined by its intrinsic features. It is by emphasising the 
action-involving nature of this class of artworks, then, that the virtue-theoretic approach 
is able to most closely align them with an existing model of moral and epistemic conduct. 
 
Many artworks, however, are plausibly conceived of not as actions, but as the static 
products of an individual’s artistic activity.5 A painting is not itself an action or suite of 
actions, and nor is a poem, a novel, or a sculpture. All are the final output of an agent’s 
creative endeavour; they are not identical to that endeavour, as dancing or singing may 
be. For examples such as these, the ‘machine product’ challenge is evident: why should 
entities that are distinct from and external to an individual be thought to accrue any 
special evaluative significance from the quality of that individual’s character? Even if a 
given act of painting or sculpting reflects admirable motivations, for example, it is a 
further question as to whether this motivational value attaches also to the finished 
products of that virtuous creative activity.  
 
                                                        
5 It should be noted here that there are ontologies of art that take it to be a general truth that works of art are to be 
identified not with material objects, but rather with actions. For example, with token acts of articulating a particular 
artistic content (Davies 2004, 2005), or with action-types in which an artist arrives at a certain pattern or structure, such 
as an arrangement of musical sounds or brushstrokes (Currie 1989). Such views are apt to avoid Zagzebski’s ‘machine 
product’ challenge, but are not uncontroversial (see, e.g., Levinson 1992; Matravers 2005; Matheson & Caplan 2008). 
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting these alternatives.  
I propose that art objects can inherit the virtuous or vicious qualities of its creator, when 
they embody, express, or reveal traits of her character. That is, there are some works of 
art that stand in a relation to their author, and her cares, concerns, and motivations, that 
is closer than that which a machine product bears to its producer. When a virtue is 
manifested in a work in one of these ways, it is appropriate to evaluate it on this basis, as 
an object that is the product not only of an individual’s skilled agency, but as something 
shaped and crafted according to what she cares about.  
 
Consider, firstly, that many works of art are designed to perform a communicative act: to 
express an opinion or emotion, to make a protest or promote a manifesto, to confess, to 
give thanks or pay tribute, and so forth.6 That is, they are not simply static objects with 
arrangements of perceptible properties; they are vehicles of the artist’s agency – they 
carry and convey her messages; divulge her inner feelings; set out her stall on matters of 
importance. In this way, the artist’s cares and concerns are revealed in the work, and 
something of her character is open for public observation. When we read a confessional 
poem, we learn of its author’s aesthetic courage and honesty - her willingness to expose 
her most private thoughts and feelings to her audience for the sake of her art – and thus 
of the aesthetic virtues she brought to bear in the work. As Dutton puts it: “works of art 
represent the ways in which artists solve problems, overcome obstacles, make do with 
available materials… the work of art has a human origin, and must be understood as 
such” (1979: 24). In cases like the confessional poem, we can see that the work must be 
understood not only as the product of a human’s skilled activity, but as something that 
reflects what she cares about, and what she intends for the work to do. The challenges 
and obstacles faced by the agent in the process of creation are not only technical hurdles 
(the ones to be overcome by excellences of artistic execution) but tests of character. The 
object is the way that it is, in this case, because the agent has committed to making 
certain personal revelations, to opening herself up to critical eyes, and to setting aside 
concerns of privacy and vanity for the sake of the art work. 
 
Secondly, the expressive properties of an artwork can embody an agent’s virtues. A 
painted image, for example, that is richly expressive can disclose the artist’s dedication to 
the work: that she has put so much of herself into the painting is visible in the way that it 
expresses her anger, or her grief, say. Here, the painter’s aesthetically conscientious 
                                                        
6 See Maitland 1975: 192 for discussion.  
attitude – that is, her overarching concern for the promotion of beauty – comes over in 
the expressive character of the work. Moreover, when the piece reveals her own deeply 
held cares and interests, it may again be suitably described as an honest work, or a work 
with integrity. Conversely, a work that is expressively flat and unemotional may reflect a 
lack of concern on the artist’s part – a failure to invest in the work in question, 
motivationally.  
 
Thirdly, the structural features of a work of art – that is, the ways in which it is put 
together, including its various formal, non-representational properties - can embody 
virtues and vices. A novel with an experimental narrative structure, for example, may be 
bold in its refusal to conform to convention, while one that does the opposite may be 
lazy. The same goes for the sculptor’s use of materials; the painter’s colours; the 
composer’s decisions on the dynamics of a piece; and so forth – in each case, the 
features of the medium (broadly speaking), as much as the content and expressiveness of 
the work, can reflect what matters to the artist, and the choices she has made in the 
course of making the art object. Vices of the artist, too, can show up in the structural 
properties of a work: a writer’s vanity can be visible in her prose’s overwrought 
complexity, which reveals an immodest desire to impress, for instance. 
 
In such scenarios, any comprehensive explanation of the why the artwork has the 
properties that it does must advert to features of the artist’s character and motivations. 
Why is this song’s tune so similar to the artist’s previous, profitable work? Because it was 
motivated by a desire for continued popularity and income, rather than by a love of 
novelty and melodic excellence. Why does this text have its peculiar, experimental 
structure? Because the author had courage, and a dedication to her craft. It is possible to 
learn about the agent’s motivations by perceiving her artwork, and it is possible to learn 
about the qualities of the artwork by knowing the agent’s motivations. We can see the 
writer’s apathy in the sloppy character of her prose, for example, and the painter’s 
honesty in her faithful depiction of her portrait sitter. This access is not infallible, 
however – we can go wrong in attributing motivational qualities to a work on the basis of 
its perceptible features. The experimental structure of the novel may turn out to have 
been an artefact of a printing error; the passionate brush-strokes entirely accidental; and 
so forth. Similarly, discovering that an artist’s motivations were not as they seem can alter 
our evaluation of the artwork. Our opinion of an intimate, heartfelt ballad, for instance, 
changes when we learn that it was written by a cynical team of music executives, for this 
forces us to rethink what the work does – it can no longer be properly thought of as a 
sincere, courageous disclosure of an individual’s private thoughts and feelings. Once 
again, these evaluative changes indicate that we tend to approach artistic outputs with the 
implicit assumption that they constitute manifestations of their creator’s virtues. Firstly 
as products of her skills and abilities as an artist, and secondly as objects in which the 
artist has invested time, effort, and concern, and that express or reveal her commitments 
and values.  
 
We now have on the table four possible sources of value that emerge from the analysis 
of the relation between an agent’s aesthetic virtues and the artworks with which she is 
associated. There is the eudaimonic value that accrues to the virtues through their 
connection to practises of emotional sharing (Goldie); the intrinsic value that accrues to 
the virtues through their constituting pro-attitudes towards intrinsic aesthetic goods 
(Lopes); the achievement value that accrues to artworks through their connection to the 
agent’s faculty excellences; and the motivational value that accrues to artworks due to 
their authors’ love of the aesthetically good. All four are capable of coming apart: we can 
have artworks that are well motivated but poorly crafted and which afford little 
emotional engagement; skilful artistic achievements performed by an agent who cares 
little for beauty; and so forth. These distinctions reflect that the question of why art 
matters to us permits, from the point of view of a virtue theory of art, a variety of 
answers. Sometimes, art matters insofar as it affords a shared emotional response; 
sometimes it matters insofar as it represents an achievement at the outer limit of an 
individual’s ability; sometimes it matters insofar as it discloses an agent’s character; 
sometimes it matters for its intrinsic properties.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The virtue-theoretic approach to aesthetics encourages us to attend to the qualities and 
characteristics of authors and appreciators of works of art, and to understand the value 
and significance of those works as flowing, in part, from an individual’s virtues and vices. 
In common with debates over how best to characterise the intellectual virtues, we have 
seen that there are two non-identical ways of circumscribing distinctively aesthetic forms 
of virtue. We can treat them as deep and abiding traits of an agent’s character, reflecting 
an enduring concern for the aesthetically good that permeates her creative and 
appreciative activity, or as a profile of skills and talents that enable her to realise her 
artistic aims. The aesthetic vices, in turn, may involve a failure to properly care for 
aesthetic goods such as beauty, novelty, or expressive power; or they may lie at the level 
of execution, and constitute a lack of precision, dexterity, gracefulness and so forth. 
 
Any full characterisation of aesthetic virtue ought to appeal to both of these categories in 
specifying what it is for a person to be aesthetically excellent; not least because they are 
not always strictly separable. Without a regulative grip upon her own skills and abilities, 
and their limits, an agent cannot fully instantiate trait virtues such as aesthetic honesty, 
ambition, and humility. And there are virtues of artistic execution that require particular 
traits of character in order to be acquired or instantiated, such as the patience to become 
a brilliant pianist, or the determination and ambition involved in sculpting in marble. It is 
not possible, then, to hive off excellent aesthetic character traits as especially deserving of 
the ‘virtue’ label, even given their proximity to traditional Aristotelian categories, because 
they are too intimately bound up with qualities of the aesthetic faculties.  
 
The distinction in kinds of aesthetic virtue can be put to philosophical work, moreover, 
in permitting us to isolate and explain two of the forms of value that accrue to art objects 
and performances in their capacity as outputs of virtuous agency. Virtues of execution 
yield achievements that are creditable to their authors – personal successes that 
overcome obstacles and represent triumphs of human ability. Artworks that are the 
products of virtues of aesthetic character express, reflect, or embody high-quality 
motives – they are driven by a concern for the aesthetically good – and so sit alongside 
moral and intellectual actions in accruing value from the agent’s virtuous internal 
condition. 
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